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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Case of Abdullah Ocalan Related with the
Vicissitudes of the Kurds
In 1992, the writer Christopher Hitchens used a very effec-
tive expression to describe the Kurdish population:
[They] are homeless even at home, and stateless abroad. Their
ancient woes are locked inside an obscure language. They have
powerful, impatient enemies and a few rather easily bored
friends. Their traditional society is considered a nuisance at worst
and a curiosity at best. For them the act of survival, even identity
itself, is a kind of victory.'
Since the medieval period, Kurdistan, the area inhabited
by the Kurds, has been ridden by continuous conflicts and de-
struction. The most significant persecution of the Kurds, how-
ever, did not begin until the period before World War I. At that
time, Kurdistan was contained within the Ottoman Empire,
and the Ottomans feared collaboration between their Russian
enemies and the Kurds. 2
1 Christopher Hitchens, The Struggle of the Kurds, 182 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC
32, 60 (AuG. 1992) quoted in Edip Yuksel, Yes I am a Kurd, 7 D.C.L. J. INT'L L. &
PR~c. 359, 359 (1998).
2 See A Brief History Of The Kurdistan Workers Party (P1KK), at http://burn.
ucsd.edu/-ats/PKKpkk-hist.html [hereinafter A Brief History].
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When the Ottoman Empire surrendered at the end of the
war, the Allies supported the Kurds' nationalist sentiment
against the two new countries which took possession of that
piece of land: Turkey and Iran. The Allies thought that Kurds
should be assured of an absolute unmolested opportunity of au-
tonomous development. Unfortunately for the Kurds, the
Treaty Of Sevres, 3 which contained the Allies' considerations,
was never implemented.
The Lausanne Treaty4 of 1923 did provide some protections
for "non-Muslim minorities," but the Turkish government de-
nied the applicability of these provisions to the Kurds. 5 Near
the beginning of World War II, the Allies abandoned the Kurd-
ish cause and the United Kingdom and the USSR acquiesced in
the suppression of the Kurds by Turkey and Iran.
The first widespread Kurdish revolts against the Turks oc-
curred in the 1920. These revolts were coordinated by a new
Kurdish liberation organization. The government's response to
these disturbances was characterized by murders, extermina-
tion of the revolts in the Kurdish areas, and mass deportation. 6
Kurdish villages were closely policed, and the use of Kurdish
language, dress and names were prohibited. 7 The purpose of
these militarized governmental actions was to suppress grow-
ing Kurdish nationalism. In response to this continual repres-
sion, in the late 1970's, Abdullah Ocalan formed the radical
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).8 The PKK's goal was the cre-
ation of an independent socialist Kurdish state, and it used gue-
rilla tactics to accomplish this aim. From his bases in Syria and
3 See Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey (Treaty of Sevres), Aug.
10, 1920 (unratified), art. 62, 64, reprinted in 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 179 (Supp. 1921).
Art. 62 stated that a commission composed of Allied appointees would prepare for
local autonomy in those regions where the Kurdish element is preponderant lying
east of Euphrates, to the south of the still-to-be established Armenian frontier and
to north of the frontier between Turkey, Syria and Mesopotamia. See id.
4 See Treaty of Peace, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11 (1924).
5 See id.
6 See A Brief History, supra note 2.
7 See Yuksel, supra note 1, at 371. Kurdish population cannot name their
children with Kurdish names and the Turkish government changed the name of
most towns, mountains and rivers in Kurdistan. See id. at 368-71.
8 See Olivia Q. Goldman, The Need for an Independent International Mecha-
nism to Protect Group Rights: a Case Study of the Kurds, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 45 (1994).
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Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, Ocalan conducted a ruthless cam-
paign, even by terrorist standards.
Since 1980, the war between the Turkish government and
the Kurdistan Workers Party has caused the death of 30,000
people. 9 The PKK is also responsible for a number of murders
of Turks in Germany. The German government has issued sev-
eral arrest warrants for members of the PKK, including Abdul-
lah Ocalan. 10
In October 1997, in response to increasing pressure from
Turkey, Syria, which had formerly given Ocalan safe haven, de-
cided to close existing PKK camps within its borders and ex-
pelled Ocalan. 11 After his expulsion from Syria, Ocalan's first
destination was Moscow, where he spent one month benefiting
from the close relations that he had with the Russian govern-
ment. 12 On November 4, the Duma unanimously voted that he
be given asylum. 13 Simultaneously, one third of the Greek Par-
liament issued Ocalan an invitation to visit Greece as "leader of
the world's most oppressed people."' 4 Under pressure from the
United States, the Russian Cabinet expelled Ocalan. 15 Rather
than going to Greece, Ocalan chose to go to Italy where a promi-
nent Democratic Left leader had already expressed support for
Ocalan's request for asylum. 16
On November 12, therefore, Ocalan arrived in Italy where
he made a formal request for political asylum. 17 Ocalan was
arrested the same day, and the Italian Justice Minister, Olivi-
ero Diliberto, was presented with a difficult political dilemma.
Justice Diliberto was faced with the question of what to do with
the leader of the PKK and the Kurdish resistance, a man
deemed alternately a terrorist by the Turkish and German au-
9 See Pam O'Toole, Hate-figure and hero, BBC NEWS, Nov. 21, 2000, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_213000/213964.stm
10 See Micheal Radu, Who is Abdullah Ocalan?, at http://www.library.cornell.
edu/colldev/mideast/ocaln.htm (visited on Oct. 14, 2000) [hereinafter Radul.
11 See id.
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 See id.
15 See Radu, supra note 10.
16 See id.
17 See id.
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thorities and a patriot for many communists scattered around
the world. 18
B. Biographical Notes on Abdullah Ocalan
Abdullah Ocalan was born to a poor farming family in a
village in Eastern Turkey, in 1948.19 His interest in political
affairs led him to study at the School of political science in An-
kara, where he became a Maoist. 20 He was greatly influenced
by the problems and contradictions, both in his country and the
world in general; he became a politician in the early 1970s.
21
He was deeply interested in the study and analysis of scientific
socialism; furthermore he investigated the concrete problems of
the Kurdish people. In 1973, while still a student, he organized
a Maoist group, whose goal was socialist revolution in Turkey.
As a result, he was arrested and tortured for seven months
before being released.22
On November 7, 1978, Ocalan formally established the
Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK).23 At the First Congress
(July 15-26, 1981), he was elected General Secretary and "The
Manifesto" was adopted as the founding program of the PKK.
24
The PKK Program calls for independence, democracy and unifi-
cation for Kurdistan: "The Revolution is twofold: national and
democratic. The National Revolution will establish political,
military and cultural power. The second phase will be the dem-
ocratic revolution. The democratic revolution will strive to
eliminate social contradictions stemming from the feudal
times," contradictions which are "feudal exploitation, tribalism,
religious sectarianism and slave-like dependency of woman."
25
PKK wants "to put an end to all forms of domination by Turkish
colonialism to set up an independent economy and to strive for
the unity of Kurdistan."26
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See id.
21 See A Brief History, supra note 2.
22 See id.
23 See Radu, supra note 10.
24 Abdulla Ocalan Biographical Notes, at http://www-personal.usyd.edu.au/
rdemirb1/PUBLIC/serok.htm1
25 Id.
28 Id.
20011
5
PACE INT'L L. REV.
Since its foundation, the PKK has been engaged in an ongo-
ing conflict with the Turkish government.2 7 The PKK rapidly
tried to find a large following among workers, peasants, stu-
dents, artisans and the different social classes. It organized fac-
tory strikes, led student demonstrations and helped to organize
the struggles of the peasants against landowners. The Turkish
government tried to stop this development by arrests, infiltra-
tion and torture.28
In 1979, Abdullah Ocalan traveled to Lebanon, where he
established a military and political academy designed to pre-
pare for guerilla war. The ultimate goal of this academy was to
create a Maoist state that would encompass areas of Turkey,
Iran, and Iraq.29 "Turkey's military coup of 1980 resulted in a
drastic increase in the state's campaign of terror" against the
Kurds. 30 Thousands of people were tortured and killed and the
PKK began a period of intensive political and military prepara-
tion.31 In response to Turkey's actions against the Kurds, dur-
ing the Second Congress of August 20-25, 1982, the PKK
decided to return to Kurdistan and resume the armed strug-
gle.32 On August 15, 1984, the Liberation Units of Kurdistan
(HRK), led by the PKK, were established and the war against
Turkish government was formally and actively commenced. 33
On March 21, 1985, the National Liberation Front (ERNK)
was founded. The ERNK is considered the national organiza-
tion of the people of Kurdistan, and it is intended to represent
the PKK's diplomatic position. The ERNK's aim is to promote
the PKK internationally, especially in Europe. 34
The ERNK has been created to organize and lead our struggle for
a national liberation which embodies the promise of an indepen-
dent and free future for our people in north-west Kurdistan. The
ERNK believes in the need for a wide political unity and the de-
27 See Role profile: Abdullah Ocalan, at http://www.library.cornell.edu/
colldev/mideastlocalan.htm (visited Oct. 14, 2000) [hereinafter Role Profile].
28 See generally Patrick R. Hugg, The Republic of Turkey in Europe: Reconsid-
ering the Luxembourg Exclusion 23 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 606 (2000).
29 See A Brief History, supra note 2.
30 See Role Profile, supra note 27.
31 See A Brief History, supra note 2.
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See Role Profile supra note 27.
[Vol. 13:117
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol13/iss1/4
ROME, 11/15/1998
velopment of the people's own political and military force which
will be the basis for their liberation ...35
At the Third Congress of October 25-30, 1986, the PKK founded
the Peoples Liberation Army of Kurdistan (ARGK). Since its
origination, it has carried out massive military operations
against the Turkish Army.36 In response to ARGK's military
operations, since 1988 the Turkish government has been de-
stroying Kurdish villages in order to isolate the Kurds from the
PKK's influence.37
At the Fifth Congress of the PKK, January 24, 1995,
Ocalan clearly defined his ambitions. The Resolution on Inter-
nationalism stated that "by effectively arguing in favor of social-
ism and by spreading socialist ideas to the people of the region,
[the PKK] is the vanguard of the global socialist movement
.... ,"3 In the course of his 20 year struggle against the Turks,
Abdullah Ocalan has shown himself to be a national leader who
is greatly respected by the Kurdish people in all parts of
Kurdistan.
II. LEGAL DOCUMENTS AND PROVISIONs APPLICABLE TO
TURKEY'S REQUEST FROM ITALY
A. The 1957 European Convention on Extradition and the
European Council Convention of 1977 on the
Suppression of Terrorism: The Concept of Political
Crime and the Political Offense Exception
The bilateral extradition Convention between Italy and
Turkey, signed in 1926, became null and void under Article
28,39 paragraph 1 of the 1957 European Convention on Extradi-
tion, which entered into force in Turkey and Italy in 1970 and
35 Statements of ERNK (visited Oct. 15, 2000), at http://burn.ucds.edu/ats/
PKK/ernk-html.
36 See A Brief History, supra note 2.
37 See Role Profile, supra note 27; see also Genocide against Kurds and Ocalan
Trial, American Kurdish Information Network (visited Oct. 14, 2000), at http:/!
www.kurdistan.org/friallschulter.html.
38 PKK 5th Party Congress Resolution On The Function Of Internationalism,
at http://burn.ucsd.edu/-ats/PKK/internat.html
39 See Art. 28: "This Convention shall, in respect of those countries to which it
applies, supersede the provisions of any bilateral treaties, conventions or agree-
ments governing extradition between any two contracting parties." European Con-
vention on Extradition, opened for signature Dec. 13, 1957, Europ. T.S. No. 24, 359
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1963 respectively. 40 "Extradition is the process by which onejurisdiction secures the return of a suspected or convicted crimi-
nal from another jurisdiction."41 The principle of state sover-
eignty is the basic premise of international law and
encompasses the right of states to control all persons within
their territory. International law does not impose on states the
duty of extradition and it is established solely by treaty. This is
the most typical way states cede some of their sovereignty and
states are willing to do that "because they realize that there is
more to be gained by giving up some of their power than by al-
lowing criminals to go unpunished."42 The most important pur-
pose of this treaty was to put in writing binding principles by
which the contracting parties should extradite criminals to the
state in which the offense was committed.
The states also hoped that the principle of mutuality would
be an effective weapon to the threat of terrorism in that "[wlith
every offender extradited to a requesting state, the requested
state's chances grow that when the roles are reversed one hand
will wash the other."43 The extradition treaty should reduce the
number of safe harbor states to which a terrorist can retreat
after an onslaught. Furthermore, terrorists often moved across
borders not only to escape prosecution, but also to cultivate con-
nections with terrorists groups in other countries. Although ex-
tradition treaties do not attack the problem of terrorism at its
roots, they eliminate a number of alternatives for criminals who
have completed or are about to complete attacks.
Turkey and Italy are also parties to the European Council
Convention of 1977 on the Suppression of Terrorism.44 Both the
1957 Convention and the 1977 Convention deal with the con-
cept of political crime. The political protection clause of Article
U.N.T.S. 273, available at http://conventions.coe.int [hereinafter Convention on
Extradition].
40 See id.
41 R. Stuart Phillips, The Political Offence Exception and Terrorism: Its Place
in the Current Extradition Scheme and Proposal for its Future, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L.337, 338 (1982) (citing MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 422 (1991)).
42 Id.
43 Id.; see also Antje C. Petersen, Note, Extradition and the Political Offense
Exception in the Suppression of Terrorism, 67 IND. L. J. 767, 770 (1992).
44 European Council, European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism,
Europ. T.S. No. 90 (Jan .27, 1977), available at http://conventions.coe.int [hereinaf-
ter European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism]
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3 of the 1957 Convention stated that "extradition shall not be
granted if the offense in respect of which it is requested is re-
garded by the requested Party as a political offense or as an
offense connected with a political offense."45 It further states
that "the same rule shall apply if the requested Party has sub-
stantial grounds for believing that a request for extradition for
an ordinary criminal offence has been made for the purpose of
prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, relig-
ion, nationality or political opinion, or that person's opinion
may be prejudiced for any of these reasons. '46 The article did
not, however, specify exactly what is a political crime, and ac-
cording to a broad interpretation, terrorist crimes may be
deemed to have fallen into the definition. Often, in fact, the
largest terrorist organizations have advanced political or relig-
ious pretexts for their attacks.
Article 1 of the 1977 Convention defines the characteristics
of crimes that shall be regarded neither as a political offense
nor as an offence connected with a political offence, nor as an
offence inspired by political motives.47 It enunciates explicitly
that an offense that involves an act of violence against physical
integrity, or liberty cannot be considered a political offense.48
Moreover, Article 3 states that "[tihe provisions of all extradi-
tion treaties and arrangements applicable between Contracting
States, including the European Convention on Extradition, are
modified as between Contracting States to the extent that they
are incompatible with this Convention." 49 Thus the 1977 Con-
vention not only explicitly states how the 1957 Convention is to
be interpreted, but also precisely limits the characteristics ap-
plicable to a political offense. 50 Article 2 of the 1977 Convention
extended the applicability of Article 1 stating that,
[flor the purposes of extradition between Contracting States, a
Contracting State may decide not to regard as a political offense
or as an offense connected with a political offense or as an offense
inspired by political motives a serious offense involving an act of
45 Convention on Extradition, supra note 39, art.3.
46 See id.
47 See European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, supra note 44,
art. 1
48 See id. art. 2.
49 Id. art. 3.
50 See generally Convention on Extradition, supra note 39.
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violence, other than covered by Article 1, against the life, physical
integrity or liberty of a person.51
Despite the explicit instructions given by the Convention,
the European states have interpreted and applied its provisions
differently. In the struggle to ascertain which offenses merit
protection, there is a strict division between "pure" and "rela-
tive" political offenses.52 The pure political offense is an action
directed at the state, it usually does not affect civilians and is
not accompanied by common crimes.5 3 There is unanimity in
the international community that pure political crimes such as
treason, sedition and espionage clearly qualify for the political
offense exception. Since these acts are directed against the
state they are typical examples of acts that the political offense
exception was designed to protect.54 There is an absence of una-
nimity, however, with regard to the application of the political
offence exception to crimes involving either a combination of a
common crime with a pure political offense, or a common crime
committed for a political reason.
In In re Castioni,5 5 for example, the defendant stormed the
municipal palace in Switzerland and killed Luigi Rossi, a State
Councillor. 56 He fled to England and when the Swiss govern-
ment sought his extradition, the English Court stated that"...
fugitive criminals are not to be surrendered for extradition
crimes, if those crimes were incidental to and formed apart of
political disturbances. " 5 7 This was the first case that repre-
sented the Anglo- American "political incidence" approach.
Similarly, in cases involving IRA terrorism, American Courts
have often refused to extradite the perpetrators. In 1981, for
example, the Southern District of New York refused to order
extradition because "the realities of the modern world and the
circumstances surrounding the IRA's struggle were sufficient to
characterize the actions of IRA members as political crimes."58
51 Id. art. 2.
52 See Phillips, supra note 41, at 341-42.
53 See Phillips, supra note 41, at 340-42.
54 See id.
55 See In re Castioni, 1 Q.B. 149, 166-67 (1891), cited in Phillips, supra note
41, at 345.
56 See Phillips, supra note 41, 343.
57 In re Castioni 1 Q.B. at 166.
58 Id.; see also Phillips, supra note 41, at 344.
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Swiss courts have engaged in a more rigorous examination
of the offender's motivation and circumstances. In the Castioni
case, the Swiss court held that "three criteria must be present
to withhold extradition: first the act must have been inexorably
linked to a purely political offense, the act must constitute a
truly efficient means to reach the purpose and the elements of
common criminality must be proportional to the political
goal."59 The added requirement of proportionality has come to
mean that the crime must have been necessary. 60 Swiss courts
have almost universally held that "terrorist acts cannot be pro-
portional to the dissidents' goal because such acts are repug-
nant to any civilized conscience."61 In the "mixed" continental
approach, of which France is a representative, "the perpetra-
tor's motive is weighed against the seriousness of the crime
committed."62
B. The History of the Political Offence Doctrine in the Italian
Jurisprudence
1. The Italian Penal Code and the Italian Constitution: Two
Different Approaches to the Political Offense Provision.
Contemporary Italian extradition practice represents the
result of a combination of the repressive elements of the fascist
era on one side, and the democratic principles contained in the
Constitution on the other side. The conflict between the fascist
ideas underlying the Italian Penal Code and the democratic
principles set forth in the Italian Constitution has materialized
in relation to the political offense doctrine.
Under Article 13 of the Italian Penal Code, "extradition is
governed by Italian penal law, conventions and international
usage and the conduct must be treated as a crime both under
the Italian law and the foreign law."63 Article 8 broadly defines
a "political offense" by stating that "a political crime is any
59 Id. at 345.
60 Id. at 346.
61 Id.
62 Id. 348.
63 C.P.-I. Dei Reati In Generale, Della Legge Penale, Codice Penale, art. 8.
(trans. by author).
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crime that either injures a political interest of the state" or "is
inspired, in whole or in part, by political motives." 64
The real intent of the Fascist regime was to eliminate the
political offense exception. In this way, the Fascists could pun-
ish political offenders more harshly. The Fascist did not have
extradition in mind when they wrote the Code; they wanted
only to repress individual freedom in order to establish state
dominance. 65 The broad language of the Penal Code granted
the Italian state the right to prosecute any individual, Italian
citizen or not, who committed an act against the Fascist regime.
The Constitution, on the other hand, in Articles 10 and 26,
prohibits the extradition of political offenders, but it does not
define a political offense.66 Between 1930 and 1948, the major-
ity of bilateral treaties, negotiated by Italy contained provisions
for exempting political offenders from extradition. 67 Neverthe-
less, because of the conflict between the Penal Code definition
and the Constitution provisions, if a state requested extradition
of an individual from Italy, the Italian response to the request
could come from either source. Because the Italian courts were
unable to effectively resolve this conflict, in the 1960's they
adopted the traditional view in effect prior to the institution of
the Constitution. 68
In In re Zind69 and in In re Kroger,70 Germany requested
the extradition of two individuals sentenced in the Federal Re-
public. In the first case, the Italian Court refused to permit ex-
tradition of the defendant, since his act constituted a political
offence under Article 8 of the Italian Penal Code.71 In the sec-
64 C.P.-I. Dei Reati In Generale, Della Legge Penale, Codice Penale, art. 8.
(trans. by author).
65 See Santo Russo, Comment, In Re Extradition of Khaled Mohammed El Ias-
sem: The Demise of the Political Offense Provision in U.S. -Italian Relations-, 16
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1253, 1271 (1993).
66 See LA COSTITUZIONE ITALIANA, art. 10 and 23 (signed Jan. 1, 1948). Art. 26
"L'estradizione del cittadino pub essere consentita soltanto ove sia espressamente
prevista dale convenzioni internazionali ... Non pub in alcun caso essere ammessa
per reati politici." Id.
67 See VALERIA DEL TUFO, ESTRADIZIONE E REATO POLITICO 68 (1985).
68 LA CONSTITUZIONE Italiana. art. 10.
69 See Judgment of Apr. 5, 1961, Corte di Cassazione, in Foro It. II at 68 [here-
inafter In re Zind].
70 See Judgment of Jan. 11, 1963, Corte d'appello di Bologna, in Foro It. II at
74 [hereinafter In re Kroger].
71 See generally In re Zind, supra note 69.
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ond one, the Court of Appeals denied extradition holding that
the act was subjectively politically motivated. 72
2. The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
and the Subsequent Departure by Italian Courts from
the Traditional Approach.
The traditional approach was modified in the 1970's when
the international community decided to fight the rise of terror-
ism.7 3 In an effort to increase international cooperation, many
European nations joined to create the European Convention on
the Suppression of Terrorism of 1977; a convention that dealt
directly with the political offense exception and extradition. 74
Despite Italy's participation in the 1977 Convention, however,
the approach of referring to Article 8 of the Penal Code "was so
deeply rooted in Italian jurisprudence that the changes could
only occur gradually."75
The first real departure the Article 8 approach took place in
1982. In In re Musbach,7 6 Germany requested Italy's extradi-
tion of a Libyan national accused of murdering a compatriot
pursuant to orders received from a revolutionary Libyan move-
ment.77 The Court held that:
only those offenders who commit an act outside of Italy in an ef-
fort to oppose an illegitimate regime, or seek to assert a funda-
mental freedom expressly forbidden in their own country, or prove
that the request for surrender by the requesting state has been
made for political reasons will be exempted from extradition.78
Here, because the Italian court reasoned that the defendant's
political motives were extraneous to the political system in Ger-
many, it granted Germany's request for extradition.7 9
In the last decade, the international norms have prevailed
in the Italian Courts, and the broad application of Article 8 has
been restricted. The new interpretation has also recently been
72 See generally In re Kroger, supra note 70.
73 See European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, supra note 44.
74 See id.
75 See Russo, supra note 65, at 1284.
76 See Judgment of Jan.14, 1982, Corte di Cassazione, in Foro It. II at 125.
77 See id.
78 Russo, supra note 65, at 1286.
79 See Judgment of Jan.14, 1982, Corte di Cassazione, in Foro It. II at 125.
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expressed in the Court of Cassation's decision In re Gomez
Ces.80 Mr. Gomez Ces, a member of the Spanish Basque terror-
ist group ETA, murdered a policeman and injured another.81
The Court viewed such acts not only in light of Article 8 of the
Italian Penal Code, but also in light of international notions ex-
pressed in the 1977 Convention.82 The Italian Supreme Court
concluded that the defendant's act fell within the parameters of
Article 13 of the 1977 Convention and granted extradition.8 3
III. THE ROLE OF ABDULLAH OCALAN IN THE
KURDISTAN WORKERS PARTY
A. The Kurdistan Workers Party as a Terrorist Organization
and Narcotics Smuggling Organization
There is no doubt that Abdullah Ocalan is one of the most
important member of the PKK, and there is also no doubt that
he participated in the coordination of its actions. In implement-
ing the will of the international community, the 1977 Conven-
tion essentially precludes a terrorist from successfully seeking
political asylum.8 4 Whether or not the PKK is a terrorist organ-
ization is, therefore, the crucial determination. This determina-
tion will dictate the decision of whether the organization's
leader should or should not have been extradited.
"Terrorism" may be defined as the commission of various
violent illegal "acts, which physically or mentally harm the well,
being of an individual or group of people with the aims of pro-
moting a political or religious ideology."85 "Terrorism" may al-
ternatively be defined as "premeditated and politically
motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant (civil-
ian) targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usu-
ally intended to influence an audience."8 6 Terrorism can have
an international dimension when the group conducts this kind
of action, "on its own or with others closely coordinated, in more
80 See Judgment of Mar. 30, 1989, Corte di Cassazione II, Sez. I Penale (c.c. 2/
27/89, Sentence No. 499), in Gius. Pen. at 394 (1990).
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 Id. at 400-01.
84 See European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, supra note 44.
85 What is terrorism? Is PKK a terrorist organization?, at http://www.turkses.
com/problems/pkk/index.htm
86 Id.
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than one country."87 According to Bruce Hoffman's recently
published Inside Terrorism, terrorism is
ineluctably political in aims and motives; violent or, equally im-
portant, threatens violence; designed to have far-reaching psycho-
logical repercussions beyond the immediate victim of target;
conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of com-
mand or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no
uniform or identifying insignia); and perpetrated by a sub-na-
tional group or non-state entity.88
Under these definitions, there is not unanimity that the PKK is
a terrorist organization.
Many people inside and outside Turkey believe that PKK is
one of the rare Kurdish groups that were not fatally decimated
by the Turkish army.8 9 Those holding this opinion argue that
its struggle is against Turkey's rejection of Kurdish identity,
which is reflected in Turkey's harsh disregard for Kurdish
human rights.90 Turkey has never appreciated the aspirations
of its sizeable Kurdish population. Kurdish identity was long
dismissed as an illusion, and those who upheld their identity
were accused of being "mountain Turks" ignorant of their true
Turkish identity and origins. 91 Many of today's PKK, however,
remember a childhood of enforced attendance at government-
sponsored boarding schools where Kurdish language and cul-
ture were strictly forbidden.92 Accordingly, the PKK has re-
peatedly sought to remind the world that its armed campaign
against the Turkish state began only in response to Turkey's
military coup of 1980 that marked a drastic increase in Tur-
key's campaign of terror.93 "Since 1988 the Turkish govern-
ment has been systematically destroying Kurdish villages in
the hope that by dispersing inhabitants and barring their re-
turn, it will be able to isolate the Kurds from the PKK's influ-
87 Id.
88 BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM (1998), cited in What is terrorism? Is
PKK a terrorist organization?, supra note 85.
89 See Role Profile, supra note 27.
90 See Yuksel, supra note 7, at 364.
91 Id. at 369.
92 See id. at 359-60.
93 See Role Profile, supra note 27.
2001]
15
PACE INT'L L. REV.
ence."94 By December 1994, more than two thousands villages
had been evacuated and destroyed.9 5
Supporters of the Kurdish party have sought to influence
international public opinion by noting that in the 1990's, the
PKK initiated a number of cease-fires conditioned only on the
Turkish government's own cessation of military operations.
There was no demand that Turkey grant political concessions in
exchange for the cease fire.96
While this opportunity to end the violence that has plagued the
region was not taken up by the Turkish government, the PKK's
own moves towards a more peaceful means of finding a solution to
the Kurdish question were intended to demonstrate to the inter-
national community that the PKK has distanced itself from ag-
gressive tactics for achieving its political goals.97
One of Ocalan's primary goal was to bolster international
recognition and support for the PKK's cause. In order to
achieve this goal, he sought to increase international awareness
of the human rights abuses perpetrated by Turks.9 8 The Turks,
on the other hand, have confirmed that PKK attacks have de-
creased in numbers, but they attribute this decline to the mili-
tary success of the Turkish security forces. 99
Among the PKK's principal complains are the under repre-
sentation of Kurds in Turkish government and various public
offices, the lack of adequate education, and the absence of finan-
cial freedom for economic development.'0 0 In response to these
complaints, Turkey notes that Hikmet Cetin, the President of
the Turkish Parliament in 1994, was Kurdish, and that the for-
mer President, Turgut Ozal, was reputed to be half-Kurdish. 101
Moreover, more than one hundred deputies in the 550-member
94 See id.
95 See id.
96 See, e.g., Ocalan Declares Cease-Fire, London MED-TV Television -August
28, 1998, available at http://burn.ucsd.edu/-ats/PKK/cease98.html.
97 See Role Profile, supra note 27.
98 Id.
99 See Commenting on IHF 1994 Annual Report, New York, Oct. 13, 1994, in
Abdullah Ocalan, Terror & Crime, at http://www.turkses.comproblems/pkk/pkk_
summary.htm.
100 Id.
101 Abdullah Ocalan, Terror & Crime, at http://www.turkses.com/problems/
pkk/pkk summary.htm.
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parliament are Kurdish. 10 2 Furthermore, according to the gov-
ernment, the PKK, under the leadership of Abdullah Ocalan,
does not wish to see improvement in the education and prosper-
ity level of the Kurdish population because it is much easier to
recruit PKK members from uneducated and poor villagers.10 3
This accusation is supported by a Human Rights Watch Annual
Report, which noted that PKK murdered fourteen school teach-
ers in one month alone. This accusation is also supported by
the IHF Annual Report, which stated that the murder of these
teachers continues a long-standing practice of PKK attacks
against the educational system in southeastern Turkey, a clear
violation of humanitarian law.'0 4
The PKK asserts that the Kurdistan Workers Party is a lib-
eration movement to free the oppressed Kurdish people of the
region.' 0 5 The government replies that PKK has launched ter-
ror campaigns on anyone who has not agreed with its point of
view and alleges that the PKK makes use of drug trafficking,
robbery, extortion, and money laundering. 10 6 Furthermore, the
government points to the fact that PKK members have been ar-
rested for serious crimes in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Swe-
den, and Venezuela, among others. In 1993 alone, more than
fifity PKK members were arrested by the German police for or-
ganizing drug-trafficking in Hamburg and Bremen. 0 7 In 1995,
twenty-five members of the PKK were arrested in Germany and
143 Kilograms of cocaine were seized as well. 0 8
In 1986, a high Kurdish leader, Semdin Sakik, was held re-
sponsible for the slaying of the Swedish Premier Olof Palme. 10 9
"The Istanbul Daily Sabah reported that Sakik testified during
his pre-trial interrogation that Ocalan ordered Palme's assassi-
nation because of Sweden's decision to extradite eight PKK
102 See The Foreign Service, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 24, 1995, in Abdullah Ocalan,
Terror & Crime, at http://www.turkses.com/problems/pkk/pkk-summary.htm.
103 See generally Russo, supra note 65.
104 See id at 1286.
105 See id.
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 See id.
109 The Kurdish Connection is Dismissed April 28, 1998, REUTERS, available at
http://www.sr.se/rs/english/progran/palme/pkk.htm.
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members."110 On July 22, 1998, the Assyrian civilians of Sar-
senk became victims of one of the most barbaric attacks of the
last two years. Kurdish armed troops entered Sarsenk and at-
tacked the Assyrians in their home, killing many."' The PKK's
involvement in these episodes of extreme violence has been
proven not only by the Turkish government, but also by human-
itarian organizations like Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch. 112
The documentation of these violent events by humanitarian
organizations compelled the European Court of Human Rights,
in Zana v. Turkey" 3 to declare the PKK a terrorist organiza-
tion. The defendant, Zana, was charged, "with supporting the
activities of an armed organization, the PKK, whose aim was to
break up Turkey national territory."" 4 The Court noted that in
the interview Mr. Zana gave to journalists, he affirmed that he
supported the PKK and, as the commission noted, the appli-
cant's statement coincided with the murders of civilians by PKK
militants. 1 5 In fact, he testified: "I support the PKK national
liberation movement, but on the other hand I am not on favor of
massacres. Anyone can make mistakes, and the PKK killed wo-
men and children by mistake.""16
Because of its recognized international status, the decision
by the European Court of Human Rights in the Zana case is
extremely important. Its decisions should be recognized and
respected by the states that signed the document chartering the
110 Kurds owns up Palme's killing Wednesday, April 29, 1998, INDIA EXPRESS,
available at http://www.expressindia.comlie/daily/19980429/11950134.html.
111 PKK Summary; Abdullah Ocalan, terror & crime!, at http://www.turkses.
com/problems/pklpkksummary.html.
112 See Human Rights Watch, Italy Urged to prosecute PKK leader Ocalan,
Sept. 21, 1998 (visited Sept. 21 2000), at http://atsadc.org/pkk/pkk/pkkhrw.htm.
113 See Zana v. Turkey, available at http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/Hudocldoc2/HEJ
UD/199810/zana%20batj.doc.
114 Id.
115 See id.
116 Id. The Court stated that Zana's statement were contradictory because it
would seem difficult simultaneously to support the PKK, a terrorist organization
which resorts to violence to achieve its ends, and to declare oneself opposed to
massacres; they are ambiguous because while Zana disapproves of the massacres
of women and children, he at the same time describes them as mistakes that any-
body could make.
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Court, the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950. It-
aly and Turkey are among the signatory nations. 117
B. The Granting of Political Asylum under the 1951 Geneva
Convention: The War Crimes and the Crimes Against
Humanity Exceptions
The granting of asylum to Abdullah Ocalan should be eval-
uated under the provisions of the 1951 United Nations Conven-
tion Pertaining to the Status of Refugees (Refugee
Convention). 118 To make the Refugee Convention more widely
applicable, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
was enacted. 11 9 Under these two documents, a refugee is de-
fined as a person who has a well-founded fear of persecution in
his or her country on the basis of race, religion, nationality, po-
litical opinion, or membership in a particular social group. 120
The Convention and the Protocol prohibit signatories from re-
turning a refugee to a country where his life or liberty would be
in danger on account of race, religion, nationality, political opin-
ion, or membership in a particular social group.121 On the other
hand, United Nations General Resolution 2312 (XXII) stipu-
lates that political asylum may neither be requested in cases
involving non-political crimes nor in cases involving acts
against the fundamental principles of the United Nations.
1 22
One of the most important principles is the preservation of the
independence and territorial integrity of States and any at-
tempt to violate these cannot be regarded as political crimes.1
23
Article 1 states that the term "refugee" shall apply to any
person who "as a result of events occurring before 1 January
117 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
118 See United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened
for signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 [hereinafter 1951
United Nations Convention].
119 See United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for
signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6233, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
120 See generally 1951 United Nations Convention, supra note 118; United Na-
tions Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 119.
121 See generally id.
122 The United Nations Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312
(XXII), 22 U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 81, U.N. Doc. No. A/
6716 (1967).
123 See id.
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1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being prosecuted for rea-
sons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion is outside the country of his na-
tionality."1 24 The Refugee Convention contains the war crimes
and the crimes against humanity exceptions. It states that the
Convention "shall not be applied to a person ... who has com-
mitted a crime against peace, a war crime, or crimes against
humanity... [and to a person] ... who has committed a serious
non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his ad-
mission to that country as a refugee." 125
War crimes are violations of the rules of war.126
These rules, which limit the type and extent of violence permissi-
ble in war, are partly laid down in written treaties and partly con-
sist of unwritten customs. The rules of war fall into several
categories. There are the rules concerning the status of combat-
ants that determine whether or not a person has the right to en-
gage in combat or other military activities. For example,
professional and conscripted soldiers may kill enemy soldiers in
battle, but neither an individual civilian nor a soldier disguised as
a civilian may do so. The rules concerning the conduct of hostili-
ties circumscribe the type and extent of damage and suffering
that may be inflicted upon the people and territory of the enemy
and the treatment of prisoners of war. Finally, there are rules
that deal with the behavior of the occupying power in occupied
enemy territory."127
The treaties, which govern land warfare are the 1907 Con-
vention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land,1 28 the four Geneva Conventions (the Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Conflict, the Convention for the Amelioration of the Con-
dition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Pris-
oners of War, the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War) and the 1977 Protocols to the
124 1951 United Nations Convention, supra note 118, art. 1.
125 Id. art. 1.F(b).
126 John H.E. Fried, World War II Commemoration, (visited Oct. 14, 2000), at
http://gi.grolier.com/wwii/wwii-warcrimes.html.
127 Id.
128 See Convention (No IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
(signed at The Hague, Oct. 18, 1907).
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Geneva Conventions of 1949.129 Article 3 established the provi-
sions that each party of an armed conflict, not of international
character, shall be bound to apply to its own conduct. 130 The
criteria to establish the difference between a genuine armed
conflict and a mere act of banditry, on the one hand, or an unor-
ganized and short-lived insurrection, on the other, are essen-
tially the presence of an authority responsible for the acts of the
party in revolt, the recognition of the insurgents as belligerents
by the government and the presence of an organization in the
movement.
131
In The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic,132 the International
Criminal Tribunal stated, "an armed conflict exists whenever
there is resort to armed force between states or protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities and organ-
ized armed groups or between such groups within a state."
133
In this decision, the International Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia recognized that the content of customary law applica-
ble to internal armed conflict is debatable.134 Some national
courts are taking the view that the "grave breaches" system
contained in each of the four Conventions may operate regard-
less of whether the armed conflict is international or
internal. 135
In Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, however, the International
Tribunal stated that the Geneva Conventions apply only to in-
ternational conflicts 136 and "unless the parties to an internal
129 See Respectively: Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Conflict (signed at Geneva, Oct. 21, 1950); Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea (signed at Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949); Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (signed at Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949);
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (signed at
Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949).
130 Id. art. 3.
131 See J. Pictet, ed., IV Commentary, Geneva Convention Relative to the Pro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 1958, in JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 810-12 (Carolina Academic Press 2000).
132 See The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, I.C.T. for the Former Yugoslavia (1995),
reprinted in PAUST ET AL., supra note 131, at 561.
133 See id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 See Theodore Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of
International Law, 88 AM. J.INT'L L. 78, 80 (1994), quoted in PAUST ET AL., supra
note 131, at 827.
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armed conflict agrees otherwise, the only offences committed in
internal armed conflict for which universal jurisdiction exists
are crimes against humanity and genocide, which apply irre-
spective of the conflicts' classification."137 Moreover, some of
the acts prohibited by Article 3 could be considered crimes
against humanity and so excluded by the "grave breaches"
provisions.138
Crimes against humanity do not require a connection to in-
ternational or internal armed conflicts. 139 The Trial Chamber
in Prosecutor v. Nikolic,140 for example, defined these crimes as
directed against civilian population. 41 Such crimes are organ-
ized, systematic, not committed by isolated individuals and of a
certain scale and gravity.1 42 Additionally, in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, 43 murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against civil-
ian populations before and during the war are considered
crimes against humanity.44 Also, the Genocide Convention of
1948 covers a substantial portion of the conduct that is deemed
within the meaning of crimes against humanity. 45 The Nu-
remberg Tribunal, however, ultimately defined the concept of
crimes against humanity very narrowly. First, the Nuremberg
Tribunal applied the concept only to acts committed during the
war and, second, application of the concept was limited to acts
committed in connection with crimes against peace or war
crimes.' 46 Thus, because crimes were limited temporally to the
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 For a detailed explanation see the United Nations Definitions web-site,
available at http://dcc2.bumc.bu.edu/refugees/definitions.htm.
140 See The Prosecutor v. Nikolic, IT-94-2-R61 (20 Oct. 1995), reprinted in
PAUST ET AL., supra note 131, at 908.
141 Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., Criminal Sexual Conduct as a Violation of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 385, 410 (1997).
142 Id.
143 See the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg (Aug. 8,
1945), reprinted in PAUST ET AL., supra note 131, at 858-61.
144 Id.
145 See the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Ge-
nocide (signed New York, Dec. 9, 1948).
146 See John H.E. Fried, World War 11 Commemoration, at http://gi.grolier.com/
wwii/wwii warcrimes.html.
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war years, the Tribunal foreclosed any liability for acts before
September 1939.147
The concept has not developed since Nuremberg, nor has it been
embodied in a special convention. Also the Genocide Convention,
however, fails to include within its meaning social and political
groups and also fails to include mass killings and violations of
human rights when they are not accompanied with the intent to
destroy a specific group in whole or in part.
148
A more complete and modern analysis and definition of the
concept of crimes against humanity is provided by the Statute
of the International Criminal Court (I.C.C.). 149 Article 7 of the
Statute of the I.C.C. delineates the acts that can be considered
crimes against humanity, such as extermination, torture, rape,
sexual slavery, and it also specifies that these acts must be part
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civil-
ian population. 150 The same Article defines an attack directed
against any civilian population as a "course of conduct involving
the multiple commission of acts.. .against any civilian popula-
tion, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational
policy to commit such attack."15 ' The attack must also be
"widespread and systematic."152
In Prosecutor v. Akajesu, 153 the Chamber defined "wide-
spread attack" as "massive, frequent, large scale action, carried
out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed
against a multiplicity of victims;" while "systematic" was de-
fined as "thoroughly organised action, following a regular pat-
tern on the basis of a common policy and involving substantial
147 See Telford Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nu-
remberg War Crimes Trials Under Control Council Law N.10, reprinted in PAUST
ET AL., supra note 131, at 861-863.
148 Taylor & M. Cherif Bassiouni, Extract from 80 Proceedings, AMERICAN SocI-
ETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, at 56, 59, 63, 70-72 (1986), reprinted in PAUST ET AL.,
supra note 131, at 874-875.
149 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Adopted by the
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Court, U.N. Doc. AICONF. 183/9 (1998), at art. 7.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 See Prosecutor v. Akayesy, ICTR-96-4-T (2 Sept. 1998), reprinted in PAUST
ET AL., supra note 131, at 911-12.
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public or private resources."154 The I.C.C. Statute's definition
of crimes against humanity seems to go further than the defini-
tion contained in the American case, United States v. Altstoet-
ter.155 In Altstoetter, the Court affirmed that "the governmental
participation is a material element of crimes against humanity"
and they constitute an abuse of sovereignty because, by defini-
tion, they are carried out by or with the toleration of authorities
of a State. 56 According to the I.C.C., widespread attacks com-
mitted during a civil war may also be considered crimes against
humanity. 57 In fact, such acts may be so deemed crimes
against humanity even if they are not carried out with the toler-
ation of a State, but against the same State, by a political, ra-
cial, ethnic, or cultural group. 158
IV. THE ITALIAN FEAR AND THE FOLLOWING CONFIRMATION:
DEATH SENTENCE AFTER AN UNFAIR TRIAL
A. The Sentence of the Italian Court and the Turkish State
Security Courts
By the sentence passed on October 11, 1999, the Italian
Court recognized political asylum for Abdullah Ocalan. 159 Ac-
cording to the Amnesty International Reports and to the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights Reports, the Italian Court
believed more than likely that in Turkey, Ocalan's rights would
have been violated and that he would have been subjected to
torture. 160 Those reports focused on obstacles within the Turk-
ish legal system to the improvement of Turkey's human rights,
such as the existence of specialized political Courts (State Se-
curity Court or SSC) and police impunity for human rights vio-
lations.161 Considering that the jurisdiction of these specialized
154 Id.
155 See United States v. Altstoetter, reprinted in PAUST ET AL., supra note 131,
at 863-64.
156 Id.
157 See id.
158 See id.
159 Kurdish rebel leader freed from jail in Italy Decision worsens Turkish-
Western relations November 20, 1998, available at http://europe.cnn.comWORLD/
europe/9811/20/italy.kurds.011.
160 See The Death penalty in Turkey, Amnesty International Report, EUR 44/
40/99.
161 See id.
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courts encompass political offenses and serious criminal of-
fences deemed threatening to the State, it was more than likely
that, if Ocalan had been extradited, he would have been sub-
jected to the authority of Turkey's SSC.162
Accused of being an instrument of repression as they have
lost the necessary balance between security and liberty, 163 Tur-
key's State Security Courts are distinguished from civilian
courts by the participation of a military judge, a fact that under-
mines the independence of the court.164 The Secretary of De-
fense and the Prime Minister appoint the military judge, and a
special committee of military members effectively controls the
process in such courts. 65 The European Court has expressed
concerns that this procedure violates a defendant's right to an
independent and impartial tribunal. 66 The judges' military
superiors can assess and discipline them and, the judges, there-
fore, "can be unduly influenced by these considerations which
had nothing to do with the nature of the case."' 6 7
In addition, the SSCs are governed by special procedures
that afford fewer protections for defendants. In particular, sus-
pects accused of political crimes, like Ocalan, are subject to ex-
tended periods of incommunicado detention during which they
may be tortured. 68 Though the systematic use of torture is
well documented, the individuals responsible for such acts are
rarely held accountable. Finally, lawyers representing defend-
162 The current Turkish Constitution specifically provides for SSCs, describing
them as special Courts "established to deal with offences against the indivisible
integrity of the State with its territory and nation, the free democratic order, or
against the Republic whose characteristics are defined in the Constitution, and
offences directly involving the internal and external security of the States." TURK-
ISH. CONSTITUTION. art. 143.
163 See Joseph R. Crowley, Justice on Trial: State Security Courts, Police Impu-
nity, and the Intimidation of Human Rights Reporters in Turkey, 22 FORDHAM
INT'L. L. J. 2129-30 (1999).
164 See id.
165 See id. at 2142.
166 The art. 6(1) of the European Convention states the "right to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribu-
nal." European Convention, supra note 117, at 6(1).
167 Incal v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment of June 9, 1998, 78 Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1547 (1998-IV).
168 Crowley, supra, note 163, at 2129-30.
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ants in the SSCs are often subject to intimidation and
harassment. 169
B. The Death Penalty in Turkey
The death penalty existed in Turkey before the foundation
of the Republic of Turkey in 1923.170 Since then, 588 people
have been executed in Turkey for various crimes, such as mur-
der, drug-trafficking, and violent attempts to overthrow the
constitutional order. 171 Between October 1980 and October
1984 alone, 50 people were executed; half of whom had been
convicted of politically related offences by the SSCs after trials
that did not meet internationally recognized standards for fair-
ness. 172 Although the first steps to fully abolish the death sen-
tence were taken in Turkey about five years ago, the bill for a
new penal code has not yet been approved by the Parliament. 173
In 1999, the Turkish government informed the Council of Eu-
rope that "this bill is one of the priority items on the Parlia-
ment's order of business.' 74
The fact that the death penalty continues to exist in Turkey
is significant because Italy ratified the 1957 Convention on Ex-
tradition with the following reservation: that the Italian gov-
ernment would not have to extradite persons if they risked the
death penalty in the demanding country. 175 Moreover, Italy
should also take into consideration Article 3 of the United Na-
tion Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 176 as interpreted by the
European Court of Human Rights in the Soering case. 177 The
169 See id.
170 See The Death penalty in Turkey, Amnesty International Report, EUR 44/
40/99.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 The death penalty is also present in the law on the Prohibition and Prose-
cution of Smuggling, the Law on Forestry, and the Military Criminal Code. See
Charter of the International
174 See Crowley, supra note 163, at 2142.
175 See Convention on Extradition, supra note 39.
176 See U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th
Sess., 93d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (1995) [hereinafter Convention
Against Torture].
177 See Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H. R. (Ser.A) (1989), available at http:ll
www.unhcr.ch/refworld/legal/refcas/hcrOl23.htm
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Court held that "the risk of exposure to the death row phenome-
non would make extradition a breach of the Article 3 of the
United Nations Convention." 178  Article 3 provides that "no
State Party shall . . .extradite a person where there are sub-
stantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of be-
ing subjected to torture."179 The Court held that "the death row
phenomenon could involve suffering of such exceptional inten-
sity or duration that could be included in the meaning of Article
3."180 Obviously, the Turkish government's promise was not
enough for the Italian Court to eliminate its concern about the
possibility that Ocalan would be put to death or would be ex-
posed to the "death row phenomenon."
C. Violations of the Trial Rights and Death Sentence for
Abdullah Ocalan
For "reasons of political opportunity," on January 16, 1999,
the Italian government requested Ocalan to leave the country to
a secret destination.18 ' On February 15, he was located and
taken into custody in Kenya by the Turkish Security Forces. l8 2
He was subsequently brought to prison on the Turkish island of
Imral, where a special security measures were introduced by a
National Defense Ministry.18 3
In a letter to the Turkish State President,18 4 Suleyman
Demirel, Ocalan's lawyers stated that, in violation of national
and international law, the prison was not under control of the
Ministry of Justice, as it should have been according to Turkish
law, but was, instead, a "place of interrogation" under the con-
trol of the Military Authority.'8 5 Moreover, all those wishing to
go to the island, including Ocalan's lawyers, were forced to ap-
ply for a permit.'8 6
178 Id.
179 Convention Against Torture, supra note 176, at art.3.
180 Id.
181 See first paragraph of Conclusion, infra.
182 Turkey: Death Sentence After Unfair Trial - the Case of Abdullah Ocalan
Amnesty International - Summary of Report - EUR 44/40/99. (Aug. 1999)
183 See Press Statement of Ocalan Lawyers, 5 May 1999 (visited 21 Sept.
2000), at http://www.freedom-for-ocalan.com/eng/trial]anwalte290599.htm.
184 The letter dated March 2, 1999 was sent also to the Justice Minister 7 days
later. See id.
185 Id.
186 See Radu, supra note 10.
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Ocalan's lawyers also complained about the violations of
the pre-trial investigation process. These violations included
abrogation of the rule of confidentiality and right to present a
defense. These complaints stemmed not only from the fact that
Ocalan's initial interrogation, which took place on the plane
that brought him from Kenya to Turkey, was broadcasted the
next day on Turkish television, but also because at every meet-
ing with his lawyers there were one or two government officials
present.18 7 Article 6(2) of the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms guaran-
tees that "everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the law."1 8 8
This means that any public officials should refrain from making
statements about the guilt or innocence of an accused before the
outcome of a trial has been reached.
Ocalan's lawyers have also declared that the gravest viola-
tion of the right of defense has been the lack of security for
them. 8 9 Since Ocalan's initial imprisonment on Imral, demon-
strations against the lawyers as they travel to and from the is-
land prison have been continuous. Even worse, in a recorded
attack in Ankara, the police beat them up in the street. Never-
theless, the Turkish government did not help them to carry out
their defense duties. 190
Additionally, Ocalan's right of access to the outside world
has been violated. In fact, he has been deprived of access to his
family, and he was only granted access to lawyers ten days after
his arrest. 191 Turkey's own law pertaining to the State Security
Courts permits four days of detention incommunicado. The
right to be brought promptly before a judge is established in
Article 5(3) of the European Convention.192 The European
187 See Asip Kaplan, Press Conference of Ocalan's Lawyer, (May 29, 1999), at
http://www.freedom-for-ocalan.com/eng/trial/anwalte05O599.htm; see also Amberin
Zaman, Turkey Celebrates Capture of Ocalan: Handcuffed Guerrilla Chief De-
clares: 'Let There Be No Torture or Anything' THE WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 18,
1999, at A17.
188 European Convention, supra note 117, art. 6(2).
189 World: Europe Ocalan lawyers seek adjournment, May 30, 1999, at http:fl
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_356000/356371.stm
190 See id.
191 See Turkey: Death Sentence After Unfair Trial - the Case of Abdullah
Ocalan Amnesty International Report, EUR 44/40/99.
192 See European Convention, supra note 117, at art. 5 (3).
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Court of Human Rights has ruled that detaining a person for
four days constitutes a failure to allow prompt presentation to a
judge. 193 Ocalan first saw a judge eight days after his arrest. 194
Furthermore, in violation of the right to be informed promptly
of any charges against him, as guaranteed in the European
Convention, 195 neither Ocalan nor his lawyers received a copy
of the indictments filed against him. The lawyers received a
copy of the charges only a short time before they were read at
the trial session. 196
Violations of Ocalan's human rights continued during the
trial. For example, during the trial, Ocalan's opportunities to
receive legal advice from counsel were severely restricted. 197
Ocalan attended the trial enclosed in a glass box and was una-
ble to speak with his lawyers during the hearing. He was even
denied permission to pass notes to them.198
The Italian fear that a State Security Court would try
Abdullah Ocalan was confirmed. Because the SSCs are of mili-
tary character, it is not surprising that one of the three judges
was a serving soldier. 199 It is nevertheless unacceptable for a
civilian on trial for his life, and who has been in a bloody conflict
with the Turkish Armed Forces for at least fifteen years, to be
tried by a military tribunal.
On June 18, 1999, the Turkish parliament amended Article
143 of the Constitution and excluded military judges in order to
comply with the European Court of Human Rights.200 As a con-
sequence of the amendment, a civilian judge has replaced the
military judge. 20 1 Ocalan's lawyers argued that all proceeding
conducted prior to the date of the amendment contravened the
law and, therefore, demanded that all hearings and determina-
193 See Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1989)
cited in The Death penalty in Turkey, Amnesty International Report, EUR 44/40/
99.
194 See id.
195 See European Convention, supra note 117, at art.6 (3)(a).
196 Turkey: Death Sentence After Unfair Trial - the Case of Abdullah Ocalan
Amnesty International Report, EUR 44/40/99.
197 See id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Turkey Removes Military Judges, at http: / / www.metimes.com /issue99-25 /
reg / turkey-removesmilitary.htm
201 See id.
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tions made before June 23, 1999 should be reheard by the new
civilian judge.20 2 The Court rejected this demand. 20 3
On June 29, on the island of Imral, under Article 125 of the
Turkish Penal Code (TCP), Ankara State Security Court No. 2
unanimously sentenced Abdullah Ocalan to death.20 4 The
Court had determined that "[Ocalan] carried out acts aiming at
the separation of parts of territory which are under the sover-
eignty of the State by inciting and leading the armed terrorist
organization which he founded."20 5 The Court also decided that
in view of the severity and continuity of his actions and the
grave, imminent, and great danger to the country, there was no
occasion for the application of Article 59 (TCP) that allows for
commutation of a death sentence. 20 6
V. CONCLUSIONS
A. The Human Rights Watch Proposal
Human Rights Watch is an organization, which monitors
human rights development around the world and conducts in-
vestigations on suspected human rights violations. 20 7 On No-
vember 21, 1998, while Ocalan was in Italian custody, Holly
Cartner, the Executive Director of the Europe & Central Asia
Division of Human Rights Watch, wrote a letter to the Italian
Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema and asked that Ocalan be
tried in Italy.208 The Human Rights Watch believed that
Ocalan should not receive asylum under the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees. They strongly urged that, in
light of the widespread and systematic atrocities committed by
the PKK against the civilian population under Ocalan's leader-
ship, his asylum claim be denied under the 1951 Convention. 20 9
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Text of Ocalan verdict, 9 June, 1999, BBC NEWS (visited 21 Sept. 2000),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/englishlworld/monitoring/newsid_380000/
380845.stm.
205 See id.
206 See id.
207 Human Rights Watch, at http://www.hrw.org
208 See Letter from Holly Cartner, Executive Director Europe & Central Asia
Division, to Massimo D'Alema, Italian Prime Minister (Nov. 21, 1998), available at
http://www.hrw.org/hrw/press98/nov/italy-ltr.htm.
209 Id.
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The PKK is believed to have committed at least 768 extra judi-
cial executions. Targets included teachers, civilians, police of-
ficers, and those deemed by the PKK "State Supporters."210
These crimes were documented by Human Rights Watch.
Human Rights Watch has also conducted extensive re-
search in Turkey documenting the widespread use of torture in
pre-trial detention, as well as gross violations of international
humanitarian law committed by both sides to the conflict in the
southeast of Turkey, the PKK and the security forces. 21'
Human Rights Watch has specifically condemned the Turkish
government for the commission of serious violations of interna-
tional human rights law, including torture, extra judicial kill-
ings and indiscriminate shootings during its conflict with the
PKK.212
Human Rights Watch approved of Italy's refusal to extra-
dite Ocalan to Turkey on the basis of the continued existence of
the death penalty therein.21 3 Moreover, given the widespread
use of torture in Turkey, extradition of Ocalan to Turkey would
conflict with Italy's commitments under the European Conven-
tion of Human Rights 21 4 and the U.N. Convention Against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 215 both of which prohibit the extradition of an in-
dividual to a country where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be subject to torture.216
While Human Rights Watch supported Italy's initial deci-
sion to refuse extradition, the organization also maintained that
government abuses cannot, under any circumstances, be used to
justify or excuse those abuses committed by Ocalan's PKK.
Human Rights Watch believed that Italy must either take steps
to investigate and prosecute Ocalan or extradite him to another
country that would both respect the prohibitions against his re-
210 See id.
211 Id.
212 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1999, Turkey, Human Rights Develop-
ments, at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/worldreport99/europe/turkey.html.
213 Id.
214 See generally European Convention, supra note 117.
215 See generally U.N. Convention Against Torture, supra note 176.
216 See Letter from Holly Cartner, Executive Director Europe & Central Asia
Division, to Massimo D'Alema, Italian Prime Minister (Nov. 21, 1998), available at
http://www.hrw.org/hrw/press98/nov/italy-ltr.htm.
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turn to Turkey and hold him accountable in a free and fair trial
conducted according to international standards. 217
B. The Italian Solution and the Opinion of the International
Community
Ocalan left Italy on January 16, 1999, not because he has
been extradited but only for purely political and economic con-
siderations. There is no doubt that Italy had the legal authority
to refuse extradition. First, because the Italian Constitution
prohibits extradition to countries which retain the death pen-
alty and, second, the Italian government could apply its reser-
vation to the 1957 European Convention on Extradition.218
Ocalan's presence in Italy, however, began to strain diplomatic
relations between Turkey and Italy. The Turkish protests
against Ocalan's presence in Italy frightened the Italian govern-
ment when they evolved into a Turkish boycott of Italian prod-
ucts.219 Ankara angrily accused Rome of sheltering terrorists
and murderers, and it ordered trade links with Italy to be cut.
Because Turkey is one of Italy's major trading partners, Italy's
desire to avoid a rift in commercial relations with Turkey be-
came the principal consideration in its treatment of the Ocalan
issue.220
Moreover, Rome was afraid of the PKK and its acts of ter-
rorism. Ocalan's arrest brought thousands of Kurds to Rome to
demonstrate against his possible extradition. 221 Kurdish popu-
lar support for Ocalan was revealed throughout Europe as
Kurds took to the streets of other European nations. These na-
tions wished to avoid embroiling themselves in the Ocalan is-
sue, and, as the British Prime Minister did, other European
leaders defined the treatment of Ocalan as an Italian "domestic
issue."
Taking Ocalan to the airport and telling him to catch a
plane out of Italy was the "perfect" political solution. Extradi-
217 Lotte Leicht, Human Rights Watch: Italy Urged to Prosecute PKK Leader
Ocalan, (New York, Nov. 21, 1998), at http://atsadc.orglpkk/pkkhrw.htm.
218 See Convention on Extradition, supra note 39.
219 See M A Shaikh, Ocalan more lethal as asylum seeker in Italy than a free
Kurdish rebel (visited Sept. 21, 2000), available at http://muslimedia.com/archives/
world98/ocalan.htm.
220 See generally Radu, supra note 10.
221 See generally id.
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tion would have given the appearance that Italy did not recog-
nize the Kurds' right to self-determination while granting
political asylum would have suggested that Italy did not recog-
nize the PKK as a terrorist organization. Either of those
choices, difficult as they may have been, had a sound legal basis
under international law, but Italy instead took the shameful
route of avoiding the decision and chose to offload their legal
responsibilities.
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